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EDWARD J. 1 UEL· 
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY: GAYS, LESBIANS, AND THE 
CONSTITUTION. By VINCENT J. SAMAR. Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press. 1991. Pp. 248. 
With a theory grounded as much in philosophy as in law, 
Vincent Samar's The Right to Privacy: Gays, Lesbians, and the Consti-
tution provides a unique examination of the controversial issues 
surrounding the right to privacy. I In so doing, Samar asks whether 
a right to privacy exists in United States constitutional law, and if 
so, how far its coverage and protections extend. 
As the book's subtitle suggests, privacy issues are particularly 
important to the gay and lesbian rights movement in the United 
States.2 With sodomy laws in place in twenty-four states, same-sex 
relationships are criminal per se for millions living in the United 
States.3 Additionally, such issues as HIV-privacy and artificial insem-
ination disproportionately affect gay men and lesbians, respectively. 
In seeking to develop an acceptable definition of legal privacy, and 
to justify the degree to which he believes privacy should be pro-
tected, Samar tailors much of his discussion to many of the partic-
ular privacy-related issues affecting gays and lesbians.4 
Gays and lesbians faced the issue of whether the right to privacy 
covers them in the 1986 Supreme Court decision, Bowers v. Hard-
wick. 5 The issue in Bowers was whether a right to privacy protects 
gays and lesbians from prosecution under a state sodomy statute 
that made adult consensual sodomy a crime.6 Michael Hardwick 
had been arrested by police, and charged with violating Georgia's 
sodomy statute7 after police witnessed him engaging in oral sex with 
• Topics Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAw JOURNAL 
1 VINCENT J. SAMAR, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY: GAYS, LESBIANS, AND THE CONSTITUTION 
(1991). 
2 See, e.g., Robin Shea Foreman, Note, Constitutional Law-The "Outer Limits" of the Right 
to Privacy, 22 WAKE FOKEST L. REv. 629, 629 (1987) (noting that gays are subject to criminal 
prosecution in 24 states that have adult consensual sodomy statutes); Note, The Constitutional 
Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 
1288 (1985) (noting that "commentators and litigators seeking constitutional protection for 
gay rights rely most frequently on the right to privacy"). 
, Foreman, supra note 2, at 629. 
4 SAMAR, supra note I, at ix. 
5 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
6 [d. at 187-88. 
7 Georgia's sodomy statute, GA. CODE ANN. 16-6-2 (1984) states: 
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another man in Hardwick's bedroom.s Hardwick challenged the 
statute's constitutionality, alleging that it infringed upon his rights 
of privacy and freedom of association.9 
The Supreme Court, through Justice White, refused to apply 
a privacy-based analysis to Hardwick's claim. 10 Justice White stated 
that the so-called "privacy cases"ll cited by Hardwick in support of 
his claim were in fact limited in their holdings to protecting the 
fundamental privacy interests in marriage, family, and procrea-
tion.I2 Rather than addressing whether the Court's previous deci-
sions provided Hardwick with a right to privacy in his home, the 
Court phrased the issue as "whether the Federal Constitution con-
fers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy."13 
Basing its decision on what it concluded was a long history of societal 
condemnation of homosexuality, the Court refused to find such a 
fundamental right. 14 The Court went on to state that "such conduct" 
was neither "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition," 
nor "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"-two elements the 
Court said normally characterize fundamental rights. I5 In his dis-
sent, Justice Blackmun disagreed with the m<tiority's framing of the 
issue}6 Justice Blackmun stated that an individual's "right to be let 
alone," was the real issue the Court faced in Bowers. I7 He further 
stated his belief that the Court's line of privacy cases supported 
Hardwick's claim that Georgia had unconstitutionally infringed 
upon his right to privacy. IS 
Because the Constitution does not expressly provide a right of 
privacy, the notion of "the right to be let alone," in the sense of 
being free from intrusive government practices, has evolved over 
text. 
(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to 
any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of 
another .... 
(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by impris-
onment for not less than one nor more than 20 years .... 
8 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 187-88. 
9 See id. at 188. 
10 Id. at 190. 
11 For a brief discussion of the privacy cases, see infra notes 20-31 and accompanying 
12 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190. 
IS Id. at 189 n.4. 
I'ld. at 192-94. 
ISId. at 194. 
16Id. at 199 (Blackmun, j., dissenting). 
17 Id. (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, j., dis-
senting». 
18 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 203-04. 
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time. 19 In their now famous article, The Right to Privacy,20 Samuel 
Warren and Louis Brandeis argued in the late nineteenth century 
that courts should recognize a cause of action for invasions of 
personal privacy based on the general proposition that a person has 
a right to be let alone. 21 By 1965, the Supreme Court began rec-
ognizing certain rights of privacy. In Griswold v. Connecticut,22 for 
example, the Court invalidated a Connecticut statute that made it 
a crime for individuals to use contraceptives.23 Writing for the ma-
jority,Justice Douglas stated that the Bill of Rights had "penumbras" 
that established zones of privacy, which the State could not invade.24 
He stated that these penumbras may be implied from the rights 
enumerated in the First, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments.25 Con-
curring opinions by Justices Goldberg and Harlan grounded the 
right to privacy more firmly in the text of the Ninth26 and Four-
teenth Amendments,27 respectively. 
In subsequent cases, the Court expanded upon the right to 
privacy. Within a six-year span, the Court struck down a Virginia 
statute that prohibited interracial marriage,28 a Massachusetts stat-
ute that made it a crime to distribute contraceptives to unmarried 
persons,29 a Georgia statute that prohibited the private possession 
of pornography,30 and, in Roe v. Wade, a Texas statute that made a 
19 See Alan J. Wer~es, Note, Behind the Facade: Understanding the Potential Extension of the 
Constitutional Right to Privacy to Homosexual Conduct, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 1233, 1238 (1986). 
20 Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
211d. 
22381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
231d. at 484. 
2<ld. at 485. 
251d. 
261d. at 488 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Justice Goldberg believed that the Ninth Amend-
ment, which states, "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people," provided a better basis for 
finding a privacy right in this context. 
271d. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
28 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). The Court held that the prohibition violated 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it was based on a racial 
classification. 
29 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). Justice Brennan stated that the privacy right 
equates to "the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision 
whether to bear or beget a child." ld. at 453. Important in this decision, as well as in Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), was the Court's focus on protecting the private nature of an 
individual's decisions in this area. Previously, as in Griswold, the Court had emphasized the 
importance of the marital relationship in justifying a privacy right. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
'0 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). The Court held that the statute violated the 
plaintiff's right to privacy under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as 
well as his First Amendment right to receive information. 
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woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy a crime.31 Although 
in these decisions the Court was apparently willing to recognize a 
right to privacy, it remained unclear exactly where constitutionally 
the Court was grounding the right, and just how far the privacy 
right's coverage extended.32 According to many commentators look-
ing at the broader implications of these decisions, the Court ap-
peared to be recognizing the value of, and a right to, personal 
autonomy, in that the Court was protecting individual decisions in 
areas of marital relations, procreative choice, and sexual expres-
sion.33 
It is this emphasis on personal autonomy that provides Vincent 
Samar with the basis of his theory that justifies the extension of the 
privacy right to protecting, among other things, gays and lesbians 
from prosecution under sodomy statutes that make adult consensual 
homosexual acts crimes.34 Samar believes that in order for partici-
patory democratic societies to function optimally, it is crucial that 
government encourage personal autonomy.35 To encourage per-
sonal autonomy, he believes the State must protect privacy.36 Samar 
states that "within the context of a democratic institution, [privacy 
is] a necessary precondition for guaranteeing personal autonomy."37 
If the above synopsis of Samar's theory for justifying privacy 
seems vague to the average legal mind, perhaps it is partly because 
Samar brings to his analysis a background in philosophy, as well as 
in law. In fact, as he writes in his preface, The Right to Privacy is an 
outgrowth of his doctoral dissertation in philosophy at the Univer-
sity of Chicago. 38 In the first half of the book, Samar uses the unique 
perspective that this background gives him by discussing the concept 
of privacy and how it is defined, and positing a justification for its 
protection in our society. 
Samar believes that one of the main reasons controversy has 
surrounded privacy issues in recent years is that courts, legislators, 
and the general public "do not have a clear understanding of the 
51 410 U.S. at 113. 
'2 See SAMAR, supra note 1, at 26. 
"See Foreman, supra note 2, at 637; Craig T. Pearson, Comment, The Right to Privacy 
and Other Constitutional Challenges to Sodomy Statutes, 15 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 811 (1984); Note, 
The Constitutionality of Laws Forbidding Private Homosexual Conduct, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1613 
(1974). 
M See SAMAR, supra note 1, at 86-103. 
"Id. at 90. 
>6 !d. 
"Id. 
38Id. at xiii. 
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scope and content of privacy or why we are justified in protecting 
it as a right."39 In other words, the Court has not adequately ex-
plained how such seemingly diverse rights as a woman's right to 
have an abortion and an individual's right to possess pornography 
are protected under the common rubric of "privacy." Samar at-
tempts to provide this explanation by discussing the importance of 
autonomy to the successful functioning of democratic institutions: 
Privacy should be valued in Western democracies because of its 
kindred relationship to the value of personal autonomy. Indeed, 
... protecting privacy ... is, within the context of a democratic 
institution, a necessary precondition for guaranteeing personal 
autonomy .... [I]f personal autonomy is a fundamental value 
to be fostered by democratic institutions, then privacy should 
be valued by those institutions to the same extent.40 
As Samar readily admits, this theory begs the question of what 
personal autonomy means.41 
Samar defines autonomy as "the conditions that govern a per-
son's participation in a rule-governed activity [which] are set by the 
activity itself. "42 This follows from the classic libertarian theory es-
poused by John Stuart Mill-the belief that there are certain spheres 
in an individual's life that are beyond the permissible reach of 
government.43 While this definition sounds synonymous with a def-
inition of privacy, Samar states that privacy is better thought of as 
a prerequisite to achieving individual autonomy.44 This is because 
freedom of action (at least in ways that do not infringe upon any 
other individual's rights) allows people to develop more fully their 
own opinions, ideas, and decisions, which, in theory, strengthen 
democratic institutions.45 
In order to tie this belief in the importance of privacy to the 
Constitution, Samar refers to interpretations of the Ninth Amend-
ment that posit that the Ninth Amendment signals the existence of 
federal const~tutional rights beyond those specifically enumerated 
in the Constitution.46 Samar admits that this differs from the tra-
'9 [d. at 13. 
40 [d. at 90. 
41 [d. 
42 [d. at 86-87. 
43 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 214 (1962) cited in The Constitutional Status of Sexual 
Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, supra note 2, at 1288. 
44 See SAMAR, supra note 1, at 95. 
45 [d. at 96. 
46 [d. at 93 (citing JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 34-41 (1980)); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (Goldberg, j., 
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ditional interpretation of the Ninth Amendment, which holds that 
it was included in the Bill of Rights to assure the ratifiers that the 
Bill of Rights would not extend the powers of the federal govern-
ment beyond those specified in Article I, § 8, of the ConstitutionY 
In response to this traditional argument, Samar refers to John Hart 
Ely's theory regarding the framers' intentions in drafting the Ninth 
Amendment: 
Ely argues that since the Tenth Amendment also serves to assure 
the ratifiers of the limit on federal powers, the Ninth Amend-
ment must serve the function of bringing in additional rights 
beyond those specifically enumerated in the Constitution .... 
Ely concludes, [the Ninth Amendment] must have been in-
tended to incorporate other federal constitutional rights than 
what the first eight amendments set out in The Bill of Rights.48 
Thus, according to Samar, the Ninth Amendment encourages peo-
ple to discover and develop their own interests by guaranteeing the 
sanctity of their decisions with respect to those interests.49 Samar 
refers to this as the "substantive freedom" component of autonomy, 
and he justifies the broad interpretation of the Ninth Amendment 
by stating that because there is a clear connection between "the 
protection of autonomy as a fundamental end of democratic gov-
ernment and the protection of privacy, ... it would not be too large 
a claim for the Ninth Amendment to protect privacy as we have 
construed it."50 
After justifying the basis for a constitutional right of privacy in 
this way, Samar goes on to write that there are only two circum-
stances in which the right of privacy may be sacrificed in a democ-
racy. First, when a competing right conflicts, and the situation is 
such that the interest in autonomy is better served by protecting 
the competing right, the privacy interest may be ignored.51 For 
example, when a newspaper publishes information about a politi-
cian's prior drug use, the individual's right to privacy conflicts with 
the newspaper's First Amendment right to freedom of speech. In 
such a case, a court may find that autonomy is fostered more by 
the public having access to important information about their lead-
concurring) (grounding the right to privacy in the text of the Ninth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments) . 
• 7 SAMAR, supra note 1, at 93. 
,sId. (citing ELY, supra note 46, at 38). 
'9/d. 
50Id. at 93-94. 
51Id. at 103. 
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ers than by protecting the privacy of the public figure. In that case 
a court may rule that the First Amendment right trumps the privacy 
right. 
Outside of a direct conflict between privacy and other consti-
tutional rights, the other instance in which the privacy right may 
be sacrificed occurs when the government wants to protect an in-
terest that is more "compelling" than privacy to preserving auton-
omy.52 In this situation, though, the burden would be on the gov-
ernment to show that the interest that it seeks to protect, to the 
detriment of the privacy right, is indeed compelling. Therefore, the 
presumption will always be that privacy, as the fundamental require-
ment of autonomy, is the most compelling right. 
As an example of a compelling interest that supercedes the 
privacy right, Samar states that the protection of the public'S health 
and well-being is more compelling than the privacy interest in al-
lowing a person to keep explosives in the home. 53 He points out, 
however, that the existence of a seemingly compelling governmental 
interest does not mean that the government can justify any degree 
of intrusion into the right of privacy. 54 For example, again in the 
context of the protection of public health, protecting the safety of 
the nation's blood supply is probably a compelling interest justifying 
the requirement that donors' blood be tested for HIV antibodies. 
On the other hand, requiring agencies and hospitals to keep a list 
of the names of all those persons who tested positive for the virus 
goes beyond the interest in protecting the nation's blood supply, 
and in fact has a negative impact on personal autonomy. In sum, 
even after the Court determines that the government has a valid 
compelling interest that justifies governmental intrusion into the 
privacy right, the government should not intrude into the privacy 
right if such encroachment would foster less autonomy than it 
protects. 
Critics of this type of broad implication of privacy rights gen-
erally adhere to a "strict constructionist" view of constitutional 
rights.55 They believe that the framers "specifically rejected the idea 
that the Court should be a 'Council of Revision' with the authority 
to alter legislative policy."56 Therefore, critics believe that legislative 
52 [d. 
53 [d. at 112. 
54 [d. at 115. 
55 [d. at 122. 
56 Wertjes, supra note 19, at 1238; see generally ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: 
THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 3-4 (1990). 
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judgments, such as sodomy statutes, should remain in place unless 
they contravene a principle "fairly discoverable" in the 
Constitution57 (or, of course, if they are repealed by the state's 
legislature). As Robert Bork indicated during his Senate confirma-
tion hearings, strict constructionists do not necessarily believe that 
a right to privacy is fairly discoverable in the Constitution.58 
Responding to this strict constructionist argument, Samar 
quotes Ronald Dworkin: 
Suppose I tell my children simply that I expect them not to 
treat others unfairly. I no doubt have in mind examples of the 
conduct I mean to discourage, but I would not accept that my 
meaning was limited to these examples .... 59 
Samar summarizes Dworkin by arguing that the Constitution ap-
peals to various moral concepts, but that it does not prescribe spe-
cific moral conceptions.60 The framers had the opportunity to place 
particular moral conceptions into the Constitution to govern the 
Supreme Court's decision-making. Because they chose not to fix 
specific moral conceptions into the Constitution, the framers in-
tended that the Court look at the broad principles underlying the 
Constitution.6! According to Samar, one of the most important prin-
ciples underlying the Constitution is the interest in fostering auton-
omy. He believes that this is best achieved by protecting privacy 
interests.62 
Unlike other commentators who have attempted to justify the 
right to privacy by looking for explicit constitutional guarantees,63 
Samar justifies the right to privacy by relating it to the fundamental 
ends of our government-autonomy and democracy.64 In this way 
Samar believes he removes his theory of justification from the de-
bate over whether privacy itself is guaranteed in the Constitution, 
because he chooses to discern the practical objectives of democratic 
institutions in order to conclude that the privacy right is a precon-
dition to personal autonomy.65 
57 Werges, supra note 19, at 1238. 
58 See SAMAR, supra note 1, at 5. 
59 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134 (1977), cited in SAMAR, supra note 1, 
at 122. 
60 SAMAR, supra note 1, at 123. 
61 See id. 
62 [d. at 90. 
6sld. at 131 (citing RICHARD D. MOHR, GAYS/JUSTICE: A STUDY OF ETHICS, SOCIETY, AND 
LAW 83 (1988)). 
64 SAMAR, supra note 1, at 132. 
65 See id. 
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After developing his autonomy-based justification for a general 
right to privacy, Samar uses the last part of his book to apply his 
conception to ten topical and controversial privacy issues: openly 
gay school teachers; gay and lesbian parenting and marriage; sur-
rogate motherhood; privacy and AIDS; adult consensual sodomy 
statutes; the justification of abortion rights; data banks and elec-
tronic fund transferring services; pornography and drugs in the 
home; employer drug testing of employees; and the right to die.66 
In each situation, Samar sets up the issue and explains how his 
analysis would be used to resolve the controversy. This application 
section is extremely helpful to the reader, as it places the more 
philosophical underpinnings of Samar's theory into legal contexts 
that are perhaps more familiar to the reader. 
Samar's application of his theory to the issue of the openly gay 
school teacher provides a good example. Samar alludes to a situation 
where Jim, a public school teacher, is openly gay.67 Roger, a parent 
of a child in Jim's class, objects to having a gay teacher because of 
the harm he thinks may befall the child (presumably in the form of 
influencing the child's sexual orientation).68 This presents a poten-
tial conflict of rights situation. Before there is a conflict, however, 
Roger must show that he has a right that is being infringed upon 
by jim's sexuality.69 To accomplish this, Roger must establish a 
causal psychological connection between a child's sexual orientation 
and the sexual orientation of one of that child's teachers.70 Samar 
then lists all of the reasons refuting such a connection, thus con-
cluding that there is not a conflict of rights in this situation.71 Even 
if Roger could somehow show a causal connection between a school 
teacher's sexual orientation and the sexual orientation of the chil-
dren he or she teaches, Roger would still have to show that homo-
sexuality is in itself harmful before a court should, under Samar's 
theory, weigh which party's rights are more important to fostering 
personal autonomy. 72 
66 [d. at 139. 
67 [d. at 142-43. 
68 [d. at 143. 
69 [d. 
70 [d. Samar states that "if Roger should assert, as the basis for his claim, that Jim's being 
allowed to continue to teach would cause Roger to lose favor with God, a court should not 
take account of it. The truth of such a claim cannot be assessed on the basis of the standards 
of evidence normally relied on by courts." /d. 
71 [d. at 144-46. 
72 See id. 
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In each of these cases, Samar states that once there is a conflict 
between the rights of two or more parties, personal autonomy be-
comes the deciding factor. 73 He concludes that because privacy is 
so often critical to fostering autonomy, in many of the most contro-
versial issues facing the courts in the privacy area, adhering to his 
autonomy-based theory of privacy would result in finding the pri-
vacy right dominant in most situations. 
It is Samar's application of his autonomy-based theory for jus-
tifying a broad right of privacy to these controversial situations that 
makes Samar's The Right to Privacy a particularly interesting addition 
to the already crowded field of books and articles discussing the 
basis for the privacy right. Additionally, the philosophical base from 
which Samar writes gives this book some unique insights into why 
privacy is in fact valued in our society, and why a broad theory of 
privacy rights fits within the context of our democratic institutions. 
75 [d. at 139. 

